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 II.-205 
SHARING MORE THAN YOU THOUGHT: 
FACEBOOK CANNOT ASSERT THE PARTY 
EXCEPTION TO AVOID LIABILITY  
UNDER THE WIRETAP ACT 
Abstract: On April 9, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook), held that unauthorized third 
parties receiving simultaneous, direct copies of a party’s communication do not 
fall within the scope of the Party Exception of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510–2523. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit, based its holding on the legislative 
history and purpose of the Wiretap Act and reasoned that the Party Exception re-
quires a narrow construction. Further, it held that to interpret the exception as in-
clusive of actors like Facebook risks eviscerating the scope of the Wiretap Act 
entirely. With its decision, the Ninth Circuit joined the First and Seventh Circuits, 
deepening the circuit split with the Third Circuit over the judicial interpretation 
of the Wiretap Act. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s understanding 
of the Act is correct because it protects the integrity of the Wiretap Act and ad-
heres to the legislative intent to broadly protect individuals’ privacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Congress passed the Wiretap Act (the Act) which prohibited the 
interception of telephonic and wire communications.1 The evolution of legisla-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 
379 (2014) (describing that the Wiretap Act (the Act) took the place of the Communications Act of 
1934). The Communications Act was the first federal surveillance law, and it regulated wire and radio 
communications. See id. (noting that the Act and the Communications Act both concerned privacy 
protections); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–609 (containing the Communications Act). After Congress 
enacted the Communications Act, the public’s rights under the Fourth Amendment began to conflict 
with the justice system’s need for wiretapping. See Catherine R. Gellis, Note, Copysense and Sensibil-
ity—How the Wiretap Act Forbids Universities from Using P2p Monitoring Tools, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 340, 343–44 (2006) (stating that the Communications Act could have banned wiretapping, 
but the courts restricted its scope to physical invasions). This tension culminated in two critical Su-
preme Court cases, Olmstead v. United States in 1928 and Berger v. New York in 1967. See Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding that governmental wiretapping does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment as an unlawful search and seizure), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41, 44, 63 (1967) (concluding that a New York wiretapping statute violated the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments because it allowed for trespassory invasions of private space in reliance on a 
warrant that lacked probable cause). In 1968, Congress referenced the standards that the Supreme Court 
outlined in 1967, in Katz v. United States, when developing the Act. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66 
(1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (providing that the case outlined constitutional 
considerations relevant for electronic communications); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
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tive interpretation of the Act culminated in 1986 with the Electronics Commu-
nication Privacy Act (ECPA), which formally recognized electronic communi-
cations as protected communications.2 The Act places restrictions on the inten-
tional or attempted interception of another person’s oral, wire, or electronic 
communications.3 The Act includes a Party Exception which states that, if at 
least one party to the communication provides the third party with consent for 
                                                                                                                           
(1967) (providing that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy protects individuals, rather than specific 
locations, such as a home). 
 2 See Gellis, supra note 1, at 344 (including that the legislature adopted the Electronics Commu-
nications Privacy Act (ECPA) before the widespread use of the Internet, so the language of the ECPA 
does not fully encompass the nature of web communications). The Act resulted from a combination of 
the Federal Wire Interception Act and the Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967. See S. REP. NO. 
90-1097, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153 (noting that significant privacy cases of the time 
prompted Congress to enact the Act). Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 is also known as the modern Wiretap Act. See Peter J. Guffin, The Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, in DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN MASSACHUSETTS §§ 2, 2.1 (Stephen Y. Chow ed., 
2d ed. 2018) (noting that the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was one of the first laws to 
ascribe privacy protections from the wiretapping of both the government and private entities). Title III 
controls the rules for obtaining wiretaps, originally pertaining only to “oral” and “wire” communications. 
See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1284 [https://perma.cc/8D32-SSK4] (out-
lining the background of the Act, along with the privacy and civil liberty considerations). Congress 
limited these transmissions to aural transfers—communications one can hear. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18). 
Following the enactment of the ECPA, Congress modified Title III to include electronic communications. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra (stating that enacting the ECPA extended the privacy protections 
afforded to wire and oral communications to contemporary modes of electronic communication). A 
protected communication under the ECPA is an electronic communication that the legislature deemed 
protected by privacy rights and, therefore, guarded from unauthorized access or interception. See 
Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 480 n.109 (2012) (first citing S. 
REP. NO. 99-541, at 1, 11 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555, 3565; then citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 18–19, 34 (1986)) (describing the legislative intent to extend privacy protec-
tions to electronic communications to adapt privacy rights to the changing technologies and modes of 
communication. 
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510–2523 (protecting privacy by barring the (attempted) unauthorized intercep-
tion and use of communications); Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 
F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that post-ECPA, the Act explicitly provides claimants with a legal 
right to sue entities that purposefully intercept or attempt to intercept their communications). The 
ECPA includes attempted interceptions within its conception of “interception.” See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510(4), 2511(1)(a) (defining “intercept” as the use of some device for the attainment of another 
individual’s wire, spoken, or electronic transmission). The Act defines a “wire communication” as any 
communication made, partially or in full, using wire, cable, or similar methods of transmission, which 
someone manages for the purpose of interstate or foreign conveyance. Id. § 2510(1). An “oral com-
munication” is any statement made with an expectation of privacy, meaning with the expectation that 
a third party will not intercept the communication. Id. § 2510(2). The Act defines “electronic, me-
chanical, or other device” as any non-telephonic and non-hearing assistive device used to intercept a 
communication that is not used in the ordinary course of business. Id. § 2510(5). An “electronic com-
munication” is any transmission of information conveyed, in part or full, through technology that 
involves interstate commerce; the statute does not consider oral or wire communications, communica-
tions sent through paging devices, communications sent from tracking devices, or communications 
transferring electronic funds to be electronic communications. Id. § 2510(12). 
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the interception, the acquisition does not violate the Act.4 The objective of the 
ECPA, particularly Tile I, containing the Act, is to protect the privacy of com-
munications, both electronic and non-electronic.5 
In 2020, in Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a third party’s acquisition of an 
electronic communication and its content without a party’s consent constituted 
an illegal interception under the Act.6 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit joined 
the Seventh and the First Circuits.7 In 2003, the First Circuit determined that 
the Party Exception does not protect interceptions of electronic communica-
tions that copy the contents of the communication during transmission when 
there is no party consent.8 The Seventh Circuit held similarly.9 Conversely, in 
2015, the Third Circuit determined that an entity may gain party membership 
to a communication through deceit, so long as they receive a direct transmis-
sion of the communication.10 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Facebook 
deepened the Third Circuit’s minority position.11 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See § 2511(2)(d) (providing, however, that even if a party gives consent to an interception, the 
interception violates the Act if the purpose of the interception is tortious or criminal). 
 5 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 (stating that 
the purpose of the ECPA is to protect privacy in the face of advancing technology). The prevailing 
objective of both Acts today is to protect privacy, despite Congress’s initial intention of ushering in a 
new technological era with the ECPA. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18 (noting that the chief 
objective of the Act is to protect individual’s privacy in communications); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2523 (containing the ECPA in its entirety). The ECPA includes a provision defining the 
types of communications to which it applies. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)–(2), (12) (defining wire com-
munications as those made using wire, cable, or a similar means, defining oral communications as 
those made verbally, and defining electronic communication as those made using technology). 
 6 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 608 
(9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting a broad construction of the party exception that would have enabled the 
defendants to copy the transmitted communications without user consent). 
 7 See id. at 607 (first citing In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22; then citing United States v. 
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010)) (noting that the First and Seventh Circuits im-
plicitly determined that the unauthorized, secretive duplication of a communication by a non-party 
violates the Wiretap Act). 
 8 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19–20 (citing Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)) (maintaining that the court can only infer the requisite consent if the party whose communica-
tions the third party is intercepting has actual notice of the interception, unless the situation “convinc-
ingly” demonstrates that the first party had awareness of and consented to the interception). The court 
also highlighted the importance of “contemporaneity” to the interception. See id. at 22 (noting that the 
“contemporaneous acquisition” of the communications by Pharmatrak weighed strongly in favor of 
that acquisition constituting an unlawful interception). Contemporaneity in the context of the Act 
means that the third party duplicates the contents of the communication simultaneous to the commu-
nication’s transmission. See id. (adding that depending on how narrow a construction of the Act a 
court employs, the contemporaneity of an interception becomes more important). 
 9 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705 (concluding that the purpose of the Act is to protect private 
communication from unintended recipients and that the defendant’s contemporaneous receipt of the 
communication constituted an interception). 
 10 See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 144 (3d Cir. 
2015) (determining that Congress intentionally designed the Act to permit an entity to gain member-
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Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the Act, provides back-
ground on the pertinent data tracking methods, and outlines the history of In re 
Facebook.12 Part II discusses the circuit split between the Seventh and First 
Circuits and the Third circuit regarding the Party Exception to the Act.13 Last-
ly, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Facebook, in which 
it joined the majority, is a practical and correct interpretation of the Party Ex-
ception given the legislative history and intent of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.14 
I. THE WIRETAP ACT AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
In 2020, in Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Party Exception of the 
Wiretap Act does not apply to an unknown third party’s instantaneous replica-
tion of electronic communications.15 Section A of this Part provides an over-
view of the Party Exception to the Act.16 Section B discusses cookies as a pri-
mary mechanism for data tracking and the legal implications of such track-
ing.17 Section C briefly reviews the circuit split concerning the Party Exception 
and introduces the facts and procedural history of In re Facebook.18 
                                                                                                                           
ship to a communication through fraudulent means). When the court described the defendants as gain-
ing access to the communication through deceit, the court was referring to the defendants’ use of 
cookiesinternet data storage filesto compel the users’ computers to directly send them the users’ 
browsing searches. See id. at 142 (concluding that, although plaintiffs did not intend for the defend-
ants to be parties, they were, nonetheless); Michal Wlosik & Michael Sweeney, What’s the Difference 
Between First-Party and Third-Party Cookies?, CLEARCODE (2018), https://clearcode.cc/blog/
difference-between-first-party-third-party-cookies/ [https://perma.cc/U2L9-MX6L] (discussing cook-
ies). The court interpreted the “parties” to a transmission broadly to include internet advertising com-
panies who placed cookies on web-users’ browsers. See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (noting 
that the defendants became parties to the communication because their placement of cookies onto the 
plaintiffs’ computers resulted in the communication’s direct transmission to the defendants). In so 
doing, the Third Circuit determined that the third party did not “intercept” the communications be-
cause the party’s browser directly communicated with the defendants. See id. at 144 (maintaining that 
the conduct does not constitute wiretapping simply because it was deceitful). 
 11 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (rejecting the Third Circuit’s conception of the Party 
Exception as counter to the legislative intent of the Act). 
 12 See infra notes 15–43 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 44–78 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 79–95 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 608 
(9th Cir. 2020) (determining that the Party Exception was not appropriate or practical to apply to the 
facts at hand based on the legislative history and Congressional intent of the Act). 
 16 See infra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Party Exception to the Wiretap Act and the Role of Deceit 
The ECPA codifies the Act and contains four main exceptions that remove 
liability for entities that fall within their scope.19 One of these exceptions is the 
Party Exception.20 The Party Exception applies to instances where a party 
gives consent to a third party to intercept a communication.21 The critical con-
cern under the Party Exception is whether a party consents to an interception—
if there was no authorization, an entity’s acquisition of a transmission violates 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Guffin, supra note 2, §§ 2.1, 2.3.2 (detailing the Act’s exceptions and their relevant statuto-
ry provisions). Because the ECPA has stayed mostly stagnant since Congress enacted it in 1986, 
courts and Congress have worked together to shape the current landscape of electronic surveillance 
and privacy law. See id. § 2.1 (explaining how courts have worked with legislature to establish a body 
of law that can withstand technological evolution). 
 20 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (providing that the Party Exception removes liability for unauthor-
ized interceptions of communications if one of the parties provided consent). In addition to the Party 
Exception, there are three other primary exceptions. Criminal Resource Manual 1001–1099, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1053-exceptions-
prohibitions-interceptions-providers-wire-or [https://perma.cc/BH78-2BE2] (Jan. 21, 2020). The 
maintenance exception is for service provider employees and allows for these employees to intercept a 
transmission if they act in the scope of their employment or to protect the rights of their employer. 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). Another exception allows a service provider to disclose the contents of a 
transmission if they receive consent from a first party, if § 2511(2)(a) or § 2517 permit; if it is a nec-
essary intermediary; if it was authorized to finish the transmission; or if it accidentally acquired a 
communication appearing to relate to a crime. Id. § 2511(3)(b). Lastly, the ordinary course of business 
exception removes liability for businesses to monitor communications that occur using certain types 
of telephonic mechanisms while conducting ordinary business. Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
 21 See Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 
2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)) (noting that the Party Exception is not applicable in instances 
where a third party gains consent or authorization for an interception but uses the interception for 
illegal purposes). According to the court in In re Pharmatrak, the first party must give actual assent 
for a third party to intercept the communication under the Party Exception. See id. (noting that con-
structive consent is not sufficient under the Act); Levinson, supra note 2, at 495 (providing that either 
express or implicit assent is sufficient, but in any case, the individual must be on actual notice that a 
third party will intercept or monitor their information). Actual assent means that a party to the commu-
nication provides consent to the interception in a manner that is not constructive, meaning that the party’s 
knowledge and manifested approval of the interception must be the foundation of the consent. See 
Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (detailing the consent standard for the Act). 
Prior to In re Pharmatrak, there was a disagreement about which party bore the burden of demonstrat-
ing consent. See 329 F.3d at 19 (noting that some cases suggested that the burden was on the party 
pursuing the exception, and others suggested that the burden was on the party seeking to show the 
violation). The First Circuit stated that for the consent exception, the burden is on the entity attempt-
ing to invoke the exception, rather than the party claiming the violation. See id. (clarifying a hazy 
body of case law). Compare United States v. Lanoue, 71 F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (placing the 
burden of demonstrating the consent exception on the party seeking its application), abrogated by 
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), with Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 284 (1st Cir. 
1993) (suggesting that the burden is on the party trying to show a violation of the exception). Alt-
hough a party may consent to an interception, the interception may still violate the Act if it intercepts 
more than the consented-to portion of the communication. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19 (noting 
that courts must inquire into the bounds of the consent to determine if the interception exceeded the 
authorized scope). 
II.-210 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
the Act.22 As the Act’s primary purpose is to preserve privacy, any unauthor-
ized acquisition of communications inherently violates the Act’s objective.23 
B. Cookies and Data Tracking 
Cookies are text files containing a small amount of information about the 
user, such as the user’s browsing history.24 Under the Act, Internet users can 
bring a claim against a website for placing cookies on the user’s browser to 
collect their search contents without their consent.25 Although certain data col-
lection using cookies is a common practice, a webpage may violate the Act if it 
uses cookies to track users’ search histories.26 Web browsing platforms, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your Email?, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 697 
(2012) (positing that where the first party does not provide consent, the Act focuses on whether the 
third party intruded on the first party’s privacy). The circuit split over who constitutes a party and is 
thereby capable of intercepting an electronic transmission highlights the ambiguous nature of this 
factor of the Act. Compare United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (con-
cluding that the defendant violated the Act by receiving direct copies of his coworker’s emails without 
being a party to the communication), and In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (determining that the de-
fendants violated the Act because, through interception, they received duplicate, identical transmis-
sions to the ones their users sent), with In re Google Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 
F.3d 125, 142 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the defendants were a party to the communication because 
the plaintiffs’ computers sent direct copies of the communications to the defendants). 
 23 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 608 
(9th Cir. 2020) (discussing the legislative intent of the Act as protecting the privacy of communica-
tions from unauthorized third parties). 
 24 See In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(providing a detailed background on cookies and how Facebook creates and uses these text files). A 
cookie text file stores content such as social media logins and passwords or online shopping data and 
saves the information for when users visit the websites. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d at 14. Web-
sites save cookies on users’ hard drives when they visit the website. See Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, 
Claims Concerning Use of “Cookies” to Acquire Internet Users’ Web Browsing Data Under Federal 
Law, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5, § 2 (2018) (providing that once the site places the cookie on the user’s 
hard drive, it reads the cookie data whenever the user visits the site). Once the website saves the cook-
ie to the user’s hard drive, it can collect personal data on the user when they visit the site. See id. (not-
ing that the cookie gathers data by tracking website visits and products purchased). Cookies allow 
web platforms to include customizable and social features, such as “like” buttons, for sharing content 
and interacting with others. Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Corrected First 
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & 12(b)(6)) at 3–4, In re 
Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 12-md-02314), 2012 
WL 3343173, at *3–4 (describing Facebook’s use of cookies as facilitating social media usage com-
pared to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the cookies tracked their data, even when they were logged-out 
of their Facebook account).  
 25 See Kletter, supra note 24, § 2 (addressing how the Act permits claims about a defendants’ use 
of cookie placement to intercept communications so long as the plaintiff demonstrates that the defend-
ant so acted). 
 26 See id. §§ 9–10 (maintaining that, although the judicial interpretation of interception is jurisdic-
tion and context dependent, it is based on whether the third party uses the cookies for an intentional 
interception of a communication). Websites create first-party cookies when a user visits their page, 
and they enable the website to retain certain information like login information and settings prefer-
ences. See Wlosik & Sweeney, supra note 10 (discussing the difference between first-party and third-
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Internet Explorer, offer cookie-blocking features that prevent third-party cook-
ies.27 A webpage can circumvent cookie-blockers by taking advantage of loop-
holes in the feature without the knowledge or consent of the users.28 In these 
situations, the browser directly sends the transmission to the third party, who, 
therefore, gains party membership through deceitful means.29 In these situa-
                                                                                                                           
party cookies). This is common practice and not frequently contested. See id. (maintaining that first-
party cookies help websites tailor users’ experiences based on past actions). Websites other than the 
site the user is visiting, however, can also create third-party cookies, which they use to track users’ 
search activity and produce targeted advertisements. See id. (discussing the placement of cookies on 
the website, which then sends information back to the third party to produce an ad). These cookies 
trail users from site to site to compile a comprehensive Internet profile of the users. See Jeffrey R. 
Schoenberger, Don’t Be a Cookie Monster, 108 ILL. BAR J. 42, 42 (2020) (raising privacy considera-
tions that arise from cookies tracking website users). When such actions constitute an interception, 
they likely violate the Act. See Kletter, supra note 24, § 2 (stating that parties to the communication 
are exempt). 
 27 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 132 (noting that the use of cookie-blockers is a common 
and understood practice among cyber companies, such as Google). Cookie-blockers are standard 
software that browsers may employ to prevent third-party cookies from accessing user data. Wlosik & 
Sweeney, supra note 10. 
 28 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 132 (detailing that the actions that webpages take to ex-
ploit the exception result in the exact type of cookie placement that the cookie-blockers should pre-
vent). In 2012, a Stanford student discovered, and subsequently exposed, that webpages could cir-
cumvent cookie-blockers by relying on the exception for third parties that have submitted a specified 
form. Id.; see also Jonathan Mayer, Safari Trackers, WEB POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 17, 2012), http://web
policy.org/2012/02/17/safari-trackers/ [https://perma.cc/2UXC-ANT3] (containing the student’s pub-
lished research). Platforms, such as Google, had embedded code in the browser that commanded the 
browser to automatically send the form to Google when users visited sites that contained embedded 
Google advertisements. See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 132 (providing that, by engaging in this 
conduct, entities were able to set tracking cookies onto users’ browsers regardless of the protective 
measures of cookie-blockers); Mayer, supra (finding three other platforms, in addition to Google, 
evaded browser cookie-blockers). Relying on these loopholes, webpages can place third-party cookies 
on users’ browsers without the browser detecting an invasion. See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 
132 (providing that by sending a hidden form using embedded text, the platform falls into the cookie-
blocker exception and can track user activity without detection). A GET request is one method by 
which a web platform, such as Facebook, receives cookie data. See Using HTTP Cookies, MDN WEB 
DOCS, https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies [https://perma.cc/D2BE-255X] 
(Sept. 28, 2020) (stating that it is through cookies, for example, that websites retain user log-in infor-
mation). A GET request is a message that the browser transmits to a web page server, such as Facebook, 
which contains the information that the user searched for and a URL associated with the user. In re Fa-
cebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 607. Although this transmission is typically only between the intended webpage 
and the user’s computer, webpages that contain embedded code to circumvent cookie-blockers will send 
a distinct communication with identical content to the third party. See id. (recognizing that it is through 
the acquisition of the GET request content that websites compile a profile of the user). 
 29 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 142 (discussing specifically the plaintiffs’ direct transfer-
ence of the GET request to the defendants as indicative of them being a party). The Third Circuit 
determined that when there is a direct transmission of a communication from a browser to an entity, 
that entity is a party to the communication. See id. at 143 (noting that there need only be one intended 
party, but there can be more). Because the browser intentionally transmitted the message to the de-
fendants, they were the GET requests’ intended destinations, so the defendants did not violate the Act 
by intercepting the users’ transmission. See id. (providing that parties to a communication do not vio-
late the Act when they intercept that communication). Thus, the entity gained party membership 
II.-212 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
tions, some argue that the browser’s transmission of cookie data to unauthor-
ized third parties violates the Act because these outside parties intercepted, or 
attempted to intercept, users’ electronic communications.30 
C. The Circuit Split and In re Facebook: The Ninth  
Circuit Joins the Majority 
The Party Exception places unauthorized interceptions of communica-
tions outside the scope of the Act when the third party receives consent.31 Alt-
hough this exception is present in major electronic communication laws, there 
is not a consensus among circuits about how to interpret the Party Exception.32 
A circuit split exists regarding whether the Party Exception extends to discrete 
third parties that, concurrently with the transmission, duplicate communica-
tions between two parties.33 
In 2020, in In re Facebook, the Ninth Circuit joined the majority of circuit 
courts in holding that the Party Exception of the Act does not extend to entities 
that secretly obtain access to communications between two parties.34 In In re 
                                                                                                                           
through deceit by circumventing web browsing features. See id. (determining that entering a commu-
nication through fraudulent means is permissible under the Act). 
 30 See Kletter, supra note 24, § 2 (observing that some courts recognize the claim that cookie 
placement constitutes an interception under the Act, whereas others have determined that the cookie’s 
data collection was not an interception because a party gathered it). 
 31 Compare United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (determining 
that a third party’s unauthorized interception of a communication violated the Act), and Blumofe v. 
Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
the Party Exception requires the consent of at least one party, and, without consent, a third party is not 
a party to the communication), with In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (reasoning that a third party 
is a party to a communication when it directly receives a copy of a communication). 
 32 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 607 (detailing the circuit split arising from this exception 
due to the Act’s failure to define the term “party,” leaving it to judicial interpretation). Both the Act 
and the California Invasion of Privacy Act contain a Party Exception. See id. (noting that courts use 
the same mode of analysis for both); see, e.g., William v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(stating that the third party did not have consent to intercept the first party’s communication and thus 
violated the federal and Maine wiretap acts); Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal. App. 3d 805, 812 (Ct. App. 
1979) (prohibiting eavesdropping on communications without party consent under the California 
Invasion of Privacy Act). 
 33 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 607 (acknowledging that the First and Seventh Circuits 
have both tacitly determined that unauthorized parties that furtively copy communications between 
two first-parties are not participants of the communication within the bounds of the Act); Szymuszkie-
wicz, 622 F.3d at 705 (holding that the unauthorized, simultaneous sending of a user’s email transmis-
sions to a third party constituted an interception under the Act); In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 
(concluding that because the plaintiffs did not provide the defendants with consent to receive the 
communication, they intercepted the transmission in violation of the Act). But see In re Google Cook-
ie, 806 F.3d at 143 (finding that the statute does not exclude entities from being parties to a communi-
cation when they gain access through deceit). 
 34 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (providing that websites containing embedded Face-
book software violated the act when they directly sent Facebook a copy of the users’ browsing search-
es in a separate transmission). The majority relied on cases involving the “surreptitious” duplication of 
a first party’s communication through deceitful means, such as through cookie placement and chang-
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Facebook, a class-action suit, the plaintiff-appellants alleged that the defend-
ant, Facebook, monitored the outside Internet searches of users while they 
were logged-out of the site.35 
Facebook, Inc. operates a social network entitled “facebook.com,” and 
each of the plaintiffs were members of this network.36 The plaintiffs main-
tained that Facebook’s use of third-party cookies to produce personalized ad-
vertisements constituted an unauthorized interception under the Act.37 The 
plaintiffs initially asserted eleven claims against Facebook, Inc., but the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed all of the 
claims and granted leave to amend for six.38 The district court granted the de-
fendant’s motions to dismiss the amended complaints after two sets of mo-
tions.39 The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reviewed the claim 
                                                                                                                           
ing computer settings. See id. at 607 (detailing the majority position that legislative design and inten-
tion of the Act prohibit such interceptions). 
 35 See In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 916, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (noting 
that the plaintiffs alleged that Facebook’s monitoring violated the website’s stated privacy policy), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d 589. A class action 
suit is one where the court permits a single individual or small group of persons to represent a larger 
group’s interests; the court consolidates the group based on efficiency or the interests of the parties. 
See Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (explaining further that although not 
every interested party is present in court, the present parties represent the interests of the group). Fed-
eral procedure requires that, to establish a class action, the class must share questions of legal or fac-
tual issues and be large enough such that independent lawsuits would be inefficient. See id. (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (recognizing that a class action suit arose out of a need to address the interests of a 
large group of plaintiffs without flooding the courts with individual cases). The parties must bring 
claims representative of the larger group, and they must safeguard the class’s concerns. See id. (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (explaining that these two features, combined with sharing questions of issues and 
being a sufficient size, make up the four requirements for a class action suit). 
 36 In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 37 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 596, 607 (providing that an entity intercepts a communi-
cation when it gains access to the transmission without obtaining party consent to be a member). Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, Facebook used both first-party cookies and third-party cookies. See In re 
Facebook, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 926–27 (stating that Facebook acquires users’ data by conditioning 
site membership on users permitting Facebook to place cookies on their computer); see also supra 
note 26 and accompanying text (defining first and third-party cookies). 
 38 See In re Facebook, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 929, 937 (detailing each of the plaintiffs’ claims 
and the court’s resolution of each). The district court determined that the plaintiffs had standing for 
their Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and California Invasion of Privacy Act claims but 
dismissed them with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. See id. at 934 (noting that this statuto-
ry standing means that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently specific injury under the statutes). The court 
also dismissed, with leave to amend, the plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Unfair Competition 
Law, California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the California Computer Crime Law for lack of 
standing. See id. at 933 (determining that the plaintiffs did not allege a sufficiently specific injury 
under the statutes). The court dismissed without leave to amend the plaintiffs’ Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act claim. Id. at 937. This was the first round of motions to dismiss. See In re Facebook, 290 
F. Supp. 3d at 918 (stating that there were two rounds of motions to dismiss preceding the case’s cur-
rent status in the district court). 
 39 See In re Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 918 (noting that it was reviewing only the plaintiffs’ 
breach of contract and duty of good faith and fair dealing claims). Upon the plaintiffs’ first amended 
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under the Act de novo.40 The Ninth Circuit found Facebook liable for violating 
the Act by intercepting users’ communications.41 This is because none of the 
parties consented to Facebook’s acquisition, and Facebook was not an intended 
recipient of the communication.42 The court relied on precedential interpreta-
tions of the ECPA and the Act’s legislative history when reaching its ultimate 
determination that the Party Exception is not inclusive of unauthorized third-
party acquisitions of communications.43 
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTY EXCEPTION LEADS TO A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A circuit split exists regarding the judicial interpretation of the Party Ex-
ception of the Act.44 The majority, comprised of the First and Seventh Circuits, 
determined that the Party Exception does not apply to unauthorized third par-
ties.45 The minority, comprised of the Third Circuit, held that entities that re-
                                                                                                                           
complaint, the defendant again filed motions to dismiss, and the district court dismissed with preju-
dice most of the plaintiffs’ claims. See In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 
848 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims including the claim under the Act). The court 
granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their breach of contract claim and their breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealings claim; on that amended complaint, Facebook again filed a motion to dismiss, 
which was granted. See In re Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 918, 923 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims 
without leave to amend and ordering the clerk to close the case). 
 40 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 596–97 (evaluating the plaintiffs’ standing and previous 
dismissals for failure to state a claim). A de novo review is the court’s power to review a legal issue 
without deference to the lower court’s determination. See Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 35 (discussing de novo review in the context of administrative action). 
 41 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (aligning with the First and Seventh Circuits’ stances 
on unauthorized interceptions). 
 42 See id. (maintaining that if the court were to permit Facebook to engage in this type of surrepti-
tious acquisition of logged-out user communications, it would result in an overly expansive Party 
Exception). The Ninth Circuit viewed only the Facebook users and their searched-for webpage as 
parties to the communication. See id. at 607 (noting that traditionally, the GET request communication 
occurs only between these two parties, but on browsers with the Facebook cookies, the browser sends 
a separate, identical transmission to Facebook). 
 43 See id. at 608 (citing Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2013)) (highlighting that the 
chief goal of the ECPA is to preserve transmission privacy). ECPA precedent suggests that the Act 
serves chiefly to guard the privacy rights afforded to electronic communications. See, e.g., Joffe, 746 
F.3d at 931 (maintaining that Congress intended the Act to protect against unconsented-to intercep-
tions). The court also referenced the legislative history of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, which Congress designed to prevent an unauthorized third party from intercepting per-
sonal information. In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67 (1968), as 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154). 
 44 See In re Google Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(providing the minority interpretation of the Party Exception); United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 
F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (contributing to the majority stance); Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re 
Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (forming the majority position on the 
Party Exception). 
 45 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (providing that where at least one of the parties to a transmission 
provides prior consent to an interception, the intercepting third party is not in violation of the Act, 
unless their interception is to facilitate an illegal purpose); Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (holding 
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ceive duplicate, identical copies of a communication through deceitful means 
are, nonetheless, parties to the transmission.46 The Ninth Circuit joined the ma-
jority in 2020 in In re Facebook.47 Section A of this Part discusses the majority 
view of the Party Exception related to unauthorized third parties.48 Section B 
addresses the Third Circuit’s minority perspective that an unknown third party 
is a party to a communication when it receives a direct copy of the transmis-
sion.49 Section C explains the Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Facebook.50 
A. The Majority View on the Party Exception: Exclusion of  
Unauthorized Third Parties 
Courts disagree on the proper interpretation of the Party Exception under 
the Act.51 The difference in interpretation arises because the Act does not con-
tain a definition of the word “party.”52 As such, courts vary on how to treat 
entities that receive copies of transmissions without a first party’s knowledge.53 
                                                                                                                           
that the contemporaneous duplication of an electronic communication constituted an interception under 
the Act); In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 13 (determining that entities that gain access to a communica-
tion through the unauthorized use of software are not parties to a communication under the Act and 
are thus unlawful interceptors of the transmission). 
 46 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (holding that although the third-party entities were not 
the plaintiffs’ intended recipients, they were parties to the communication because the user’s browser sent 
them a duplicate, identical copy of the communication that it sent to the desired party). The court noted 
that due to the nature of the Act, the legislature reasonably anticipated that entities may gain participa-
tion in a communication through deceitful means. See id. at 143 n.76 (citing Wiretapping, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)) (concluding that wiretapping is eavesdropping using technology). 
 47 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 608 
(9th Cir. 2020) (discussing the circuit split regarding the Party Exception’s application); see also In re 
Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (forming the basis of the majority view that the Party Exception does not 
apply); Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (supporting the majority view). But see In re Google Cookie, 
806 F.3d at 143–44 (comprising the minority view that the Party Exception applies). 
 48 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 51 See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607–08 (outlining the circuit split between the majority, the 
First and Seventh Circuits, and the minority, the Third Circuit, about the interpretation of the Party 
Exception of the Act); In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 142–43 (holding that the defendants, who 
gained access to the communication through the placement of tracking cookies, were parties to the 
communication); Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706 (establishing that the defendant’s contemporaneous 
duplication of the plaintiff’s communication constituted an interception and violated the Act); In re 
Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (determining that the defendants’ contemporaneous duplication of the 
plaintiffs’ communication was an interception, thereby violating the Act). 
 52 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (lacking a definition for “party”). Due to the absence of a “party” defini-
tion in the Act, courts interpret the term in the context of the cases they address, which results in vari-
able understandings of the term. See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 607 (noting that the circuit split 
at issue in In re Facebook was a result of the variable treatment of the term “party”). 
 53 Compare Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 707 (holding that the defendant violated the Act because 
he acquired the plaintiff’s email communications simultaneous to their transmission without authori-
zation, making those acquisitions unlawful interceptions by a non-party), and In re Pharmatrak, 329 
F.3d at 20–21 (concluding that the defendants violated the Act because they intercepted the communi-
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Courts rely on the legislative intent, legislative history, and case law to define 
the term so they can determine whether an entity is a party to a communica-
tion, rather than an unauthorized third party.54 
In 2003, in In re Pharmatrak, the First Circuit determined that an entity 
that secretively gains access to communications without the prior consent from 
a party to intercept the transmission violates the Act.55 The court held that the 
plaintiffs did not consent to the collection of personally identifiable infor-
mation by using Pharmatrak.56 The court determined that because the defend-
ants obtained the same URL transmission as the one the plaintiffs sent to the 
pharmaceutical company, the defendants acquired the identical private infor-
mation, simultaneous to the primary communication.57 Although the defend-
                                                                                                                           
cation simultaneous to its transmission without the consent of the plaintiffs), with In re Google Inc. 
Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143–44 (holding that nothing in the statutory language stops entities from gaining 
party membership through fraud and deceit, such as through the use of embedded browser cookies). 
 54 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (establishing its sources for the basis of its interpreta-
tion and pointing to other circuits’ similar reliance on these materials). 
 55 See 329 F.3d at 19 (detailing the consent requirement for third-party acquisition of a communi-
cation). The court outlined five elements of an interception under the Act: the defendant must (1) inten-
tionally (2) intercept (3) the substance of (4) a party’s electronic communication (5) using some device or 
mechanism. Id. at 18; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (defining “intercept” as the use of some means to 
attain an entity’s communications). The Act itself expansively defines what constitutes an “electronic 
communication” and bars any interception of such communications without consent. See In re Phar-
matrak, 329 F.3d at 18 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)) (providing a broad list of the types of transmissions 
the Act covers, such as data, pictures, or intellectual property that a person sends by electronic means). In 
1986, the ECPA used an expansive construction of “transmissions” to extend the Act’s protections to the 
new computer and telephonic means of communication. See Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress intended for the ECPA to provide the same protections to electronic 
transmissions as the Act afforded to oral and wire communications). The flexible definition that the 
ECPA adopted encompasses any communication made in part or in whole by electronic means that im-
plicates commerce. In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)). 
 56 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21 (determining that there was no issue of implied consent 
because Pharmatrak intentionally collected data in a secretive manner). The court ascertained that the 
clients received guarantees from the defendant that the webpage did not engage in the gathering of per-
sonal data. See id. at 20 (noting additionally that the clients specifically conditioned their use of Phar-
matrak’s software on the company not gathering such information). Pharmatrak is a web-based com-
pany that provides a service to compare pharmaceutical companies, and it was through this service 
that the defendant collected users’ personal data. See id. at 12 (adding that pharmaceutical companies 
expressly requested that Pharmatrak not engage in this data collection). The court identified three areas 
of concern that supported its finding: (1) an inference that the parties consented to this interception is 
incongruent with the legislative purpose of the Act, (2) this interpretation would undermine efforts of a 
party to seek privacy protections for their electronic communications, and (3) it would result in unreason-
able conclusions. See id. at 20 (detailing the court’s interpretation of the Party Exception and the protec-
tions the Act affords to communications). 
 57 Id. at 22 (emphasizing that the acquisition of the same URL string was indicative of a duplica-
tion of an identical communication to the plaintiffs). In concluding this point, the court added that, 
although the communication was facially separate, because it occurred simultaneously and was identi-
cal in content to that of the plaintiffs, it satisfied the most stringent timing requirements. See id. (not-
ing that a narrow construction of “interception” would require an automatic duplication of communi-
cations as the user sent them). 
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ants argued that their conduct should not constitute an interception under the 
Act, the court rejected this argument because the defendants acquired the con-
tents of the communication simultaneous to its transmission and without party 
authorization.58 As such, it was inconsequential that the defendants gained the 
information through a separate transmission; the acquisition was a concurrent 
duplication of the intended communication, which constituted an interception 
under the Act.59 
In 2010, in United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, the Seventh Circuit interpret-
ed the Party Exception as not applying to intentional and contemporaneous 
interceptions, which instead constitute a violation of the Act, regardless of 
which device actually copies the data.60 In this case, the defendant modified a 
co-worker’s email settings to forward them to his computer, where he kept 
them in a folder on his email account.61 The defendant alleged that because his 
co-worker’s computer sent him the emails directly, he did not intercept the 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See id. (noting that “contemporaneous” means that the defendant acquired the communication 
at the same time as the transmission, not that the defendant acquired the exact same communication as 
the transmission); Reply Brief of Pharmatrak & Glocal in Further Support of Their Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment Regarding Plaintiffs’ Claim Under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and Separately for Lack of Arti-
cle III Standing at 4, In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 
CIV.A.00–11672), 2003 WL 24272672, at *4. (outlining the defendant’s arguments as they pertain to 
the interception). The defendants argued that they did not intercept the communication because it was 
a distinct transmission from the communication between the user and the pharmaceutical company. See 
In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (focusing on the separateness of the transmissions, not their simulta-
neous and identical nature). The court rejected this argument and established that a third party’s intercep-
tion of a communication does not require that the acquisition be part of the same communication, only 
that it occur contemporaneous to the transmission. See id. (discussing what constitutes “contemporane-
ous” in regard to an interception under the Act). 
 59 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (noting that the defendant’s argument that there were two 
separate communications failed because under the Act, an interception only requires that the third 
party contemporaneously acquire content identical to the first party communication). 
 60 See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2010) (placing the focus 
of the violation not on the physical method of interception, but rather the timing). This interpretation 
was in line with the First Circuit’s holding in In re Pharmatrak. See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re 
Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating that the First and 
Seventh Circuits comprise the majority in the circuit split over the Party Exception); see also In re 
Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (finding that the contemporaneous duplication of a communication vio-
lates the Act). The court noted that it is inconsequential which computer actually duplicated the 
transmission because computers communicate by breaking down the transmission into message 
“packets” that move across a group of computers. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 704–05. The packet 
travels on its own and the receiving computer reassembles the packet upon arrival. See id. (providing 
that the individual packets contain portions of the message and the instructions for arriving at the 
intended destination). At the end, the computer can reassemble the communication to form the com-
plete message. See id. (detailing that the computer reassembles the packets to form the message re-
gardless of the order in which the computer received the packets and if any information was resent or 
sent across a different route). 
 61 See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 703 (suggesting that the defendant likely modified his co-
worker’s email settings while his co-worker was away from her desk). 
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communications and thus did not violate the Act.62 The court rejected this ar-
gument, maintaining that it did not matter that his co-worker’s computer for-
warded him the emails.63 The Seventh Circuit honed in on a clear explanation 
of “interception,” placing emphasis on the simultaneity of the interception ra-
ther than the means of acquisition.64 
B. The Third Circuit Minority Perspective—Deceitful Acquisition  
Falls into the Party Exception 
Unlike the First and Seventh Circuits, the Third Circuit, in In re Google 
Cookie, determined that when an entity receives a direct copy of a users’ com-
munication, that entity becomes an intended destination for the users’ trans-
mission.65 The court concluded that the Party Exception includes entities that 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. (noting that the defendant argued that the court should have charged him under the 
Stored Communications Act instead of the Act because although he received the communication di-
rectly, he stored it illegitimately). The defendant argued that, because he was a party to the communi-
cation, he fell within the Party Exception. See id. (summarizing the defendant’s argument that he 
sometimes operated as acting manager and legitimately received emails intended for his co-worker). 
The defendant also maintained that he did not intercept the transmissions because the system forward-
ed him the emails after they reached his co-worker’s inbox. See id. (maintaining that an interception 
requires an acquisition of the communication as it is sent to the intended party). The court rejected this 
argument. See id. at 703, 705 (denying the defendant’s contention that he did not “catch [the commu-
nication] in flight”). 
 63 See id. at 706 (dismissing the defendant’s argument that his co-worker’s computer acted as a 
conduit to facilitate the messages’ delivery). The court provided that the central purpose of the Act is 
to protect the privacy of communications, including email transmissions. See id. (outlining the Act 
and its key provisions of preserving the privacy of electronic communications and preventing unau-
thorized interceptions). The court noted that the focus of the Act is on whether an unauthorized party 
intercepted the communication “contemporaneous” to its transmission. See id. at 705 (maintaining 
that the timing of the interception is what caused the court to categorize the violation under the Act 
rather than the Stored Communications Act). 
 64 See id. at 706 (explaining that contemporaneous interceptions do not require intercepting the 
communication in the middle of its transmission but, instead, acquiring the transmission at the same 
time as the intended party or intercepting it at a time prior to the communication entering storage). 
The court recognized that electronic communications are data packets that browsers transmit through 
various methods that are, ultimately, irrelevant under the statute. See id. at 704 (providing that the 
means of transmission and order of reception are irrelevant because the computers put the communi-
cation back together upon receipt). The Act is concerned with the simultaneity of duplication, rather 
than the interception of the message in the middle of its transmission. See id. at 706 (noting that to 
understand “contemporaneous” to mean intercepting a transmission in the middle of its sending is to 
misunderstand the word). 
 65 See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 
2015) (determining that the users’ computers directly sent the GET requests to the defendants, making 
them one of the users’ intentional destinations and, therefore, members of the communication). The 
communication at issue was the transmission of the users’ GET requests to intended websites, with 
the websites sending an identical copy of the GET request to the defendants. See id. at 140 (noting that 
the sender and the intended recipients are the parties to the communication). The Third Circuit’s de-
termination directly contrasts with the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Szymuszkiewicz. See 622 F.3d at 
703, 706 (holding that unauthorized parties who duplicated communications violated the Act and did 
not fall within the scope of the Party Exception). But see In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (con-
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gain their access to the transmission though deceit.66 The defendants placed 
third-party cookies on the users’ computers.67 This induced the browser to di-
rectly send the defendants copies of users’ transmissions, believing it was a 
first party participant in the communication.68 The plaintiffs asserted that the 
defendants’ conduct violated the Act because they were third parties intercept-
ing the communication.69 The court, however, found that the language of the 
statute does not suggest that entities may not use fraud to become parties to a 
communication.70 
                                                                                                                           
flicting with the Seventh Circuit’s holding by finding that unauthorized entities were parties to the 
communication upon receipt of a direct transmission). 
 66 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (noting that these cookie-setting entities tricked the 
users’ browsers into viewing them as first-party participants in the communication). The court reached 
its conclusion by assessing the relationship between the statute’s definition of parties to a communica-
tion as compared to its definition of interceptions. See id. at 144 n.80 (indicating that the Act’s defini-
tion of “intercept” does not preclude the defendants’ use of deceitful practices to become a party to the 
communication). 
 67 See id. at 141 (noting that the defendants placed the cookies on the users’ browsers and re-
ceived duplications of their transmissions without the users’ knowledge). A cookie text file stores 
content such as social media logins and passwords or online shopping data and saves the information 
for when users visit the websites. Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 
F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 68 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 132 (stating that the defendants’ placement of cookies on 
the users’ browsers allowed the defendants to evade the privacy preferences on the users’ computers 
that should have blocked their placement of third-party cookies). These cookies caused the browser to 
send the defendants copies of the users’ search history for the defendants to produce targeted advertise-
ments in the users’ browser. See id. at 131 (describing that the tracking cookies provided the defendants 
with specific search terms and web activity unique to the users). 
 69 See id. at 143 (presenting the plaintiffs’ argument that although their GET request was directly 
sent to the defendants, it was sent due to the defendants’ deceitful skirting of the cookie-blockers). In 
addition to the plaintiffs’ complaint that the defendants violated the Act, they presented two other 
central arguments to the Third Circuit: (1) the court should not have heard the defendants’ argument 
that they were a party to the communication because the district court did not rule on this issue and 
defendants did not address it on cross-appeal; and (2) the Party Exception does not apply to the de-
fendants because the defendants’ means of gaining access to the transmission were tortious under 
California law. See id. at 143–44 (disregarding both arguments for lack of support). The Third Circuit 
rejected these arguments, maintaining that it has the power to affirm the judgement of the district 
court on different bases and that the plaintiffs provided no authority to suggest that the Party Excep-
tion should not apply when an entity partook in supposedly tortious actions that were wiretapping. See 
id. at 143, 145 (responding to each of the plaintiffs’ arguments and affirming the district court’s appli-
cation of the Party Exception). 
 70 See id. at 143 (maintaining that the statutory language does not forbid entities from gaining 
party-membership through deceitful or fraudulent means). Fraudulent or deceitful measures can in-
clude tricking the plaintiffs’ browsers into treating the third party that placed the cookie on the computer 
as a first-party participant to the communication. See id. (providing that in this case, the tricking of the 
plaintiffs’ browsers into treating the defendants as parties to the communication constituted fraud in 
the inducement); Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 35 (defining fraud in the inducement 
as an entity’s misrepresentation that spurs their admission to a communication or transaction). The 
court noted that given the purpose of the Act, it may even be likely that Congress anticipated such 
deceitful purposes when it drafted the Act. See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (suggesting that 
wiretapping, by nature, connotes a level of deceitful interception). The court cited examples from the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits that support such an interpretation of the Act. See id. at 144 (first citing 
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The Third Circuit relied on a broad interpretation of legislative intent, ex-
plaining that the Act reasonably permits a party to deceitfully participate in a 
communication.71 Ultimately, it affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim.72 The court 
held that the defendants, despite gaining access through deceit, were parties to 
the transmission because they received a direct copy of the communication 
from the user’s browser.73 
C. Joining the Majority: The In re Facebook Holding 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Facebook further ingrained the cir-
cuit split by joining the First and Seventh Circuits’ majority view.74 The Ninth 
                                                                                                                           
United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964); then citing Clemons v. Waller, 82 F. App’x 436, 
442 (6th Cir. 2003)) (noting that the Act does not proscribe “interception” of communications by a 
person impersonating the intended recipient); see also United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 
863 (5th Cir. 1979) (following Pasha and determining that an impersonator of the intended recipient 
did not intercept the communication). In a 1964 case, United States v. Pasha, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that the Act may still consider entities that impersonated the intended recipient of a trans-
mission as a party to the communication. See 332 F.2d at 198 (interpreting “party” to mean those who 
received the communication); see also In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 144 (noting that when 
amending the Act, Congress referenced Pasha when discussing who constituted a communication 
party). 
 71 See In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143 (arriving at its conclusion based on the Act’s lack of 
explicit preclusions of deceitful conduct). The court recognized that the Party Exception is unavailable 
to parties who intercept communications in order to “commit[] any criminal or tortious act.” Id. at 
144–45 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)). In order to lose this protection, however, the court held that 
the criminal or tortious act in question had to be separate from the interception itself. See id. at 145 & 
n.81 (citing Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 98, 100 (2nd Cir. 2010)) (stating that, standing alone, an 
interception that was tortious under California law did not trigger the exception to the Party Excep-
tion). The court cited precedent indicating that the Party Exception does not apply only when a de-
fendant intends to use the intercepted transmission to partake in illegal activity past the interception 
itself. See id. (citing Caro, 618 F.3d at 98, 100) (bolstering the notion that interception, without intent 
to use the intercepted data illegally or tortiously, is insufficient to bar the application of the Party 
Exception). 
 72 See id. at 145 (affirming the district court’s broad interpretation of the Party Exception). 
 73 See id. at 143 (noting that the Act makes it impossible for parties to a communication to im-
permissibly intercept said communication). Although the court recognized that the defendants gained 
membership to the communication through fraud in the inducement, it noted that the Act does not 
contain any provision prohibiting deceitful conduct. See id. (relying on the statute’s plain language to 
show the Act’s lack of guidance on a third party’s use of deceit to gain party membership). By inter-
preting the defendants as a party to the communication, the court, consequently, permitted the defend-
ants to use the contents of the users’ online communications to sell targeted advertisements. See id. at 
141 (describing how Google ultimately uses the deceptively acquired data). 
 74 See Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 608 
(9th Cir. 2020) (joining the majority of circuits in holding that copying a transmission concurrent to 
the users’ sending the GET requests did not fall under the Party Exception of the Act when the sender 
did not consent to the transmission); see also United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 704–06 
(7th Cir. 2010) (providing additional support for the First Circuit’s narrow view of the Party Excep-
tion); Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 19–21 (1st Cir. 
2003) (defining the scope of the Act and the Party Exception). The court rejected the Third Circuit’s 
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Circuit held that the Party Exception did not absolve Facebook of liability un-
der the Act.75 The court maintained that the exception did not insulate the de-
fendant from liability under the Act because the plaintiffs did not consent to its 
simultaneous duplication of their communications.76 The court maintained that 
the central objective of the Act is to guard private communications from unau-
thorized duplication and interception.77 The court reasoned that allowing Face-
book to use cookie placement to receive copies of users’ search history would 
run counter to the intention of the Party Exception.78 
                                                                                                                           
interpretation of the exception, reasoning that it was erroneous to interpret the exception to include third 
parties that gain access to a communication through deceit. See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 
(rejecting the Third Circuit’s overbroad position as insufficient to protect the users’ privacy); In re 
Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 143–45 (settling on a more expansive conception of the Party Exception). 
 75 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608, 611 (determining that the plaintiffs presented suffi-
cient evidence to establish standing and remanding the case back to the district court to consider the 
plaintiffs’ claims). 
 76 See id. at 607–08 (providing that the Act serves to protect the privacy rights of the plaintiffs 
from unknown, unconsented-to interceptions). The court noted that rooted in the Act is Congressional 
consideration of historic privacy interests pertaining to private, personal communications. See id. at 
598 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556) (noting 
that the Act is the principal law serving this purpose). 
 77 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (citing Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 
2013)) (concluding that permitting the defendants to track and copy the plaintiffs’ data violated the 
Act’s principal purpose). In 2013, in Joffe v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit determined that when 
enacting the Act, Congress did not mean to permit unapproved encroachments on the personal privacy 
of electronic communications. See 746 F.3d at 931 (drawing on the legislative history of the Act to 
support this principle). In Joffe, the concern was whether the Act allowed entities to gather personal 
data from browsing activity that occurred on unencrypted wireless (Wi-Fi) networks. See id. at 924 
(determining that the Act prohibited the defendant’s appropriation of data from unencrypted Wi-Fi 
networks). The court maintained that this mode of acquiring data was an unauthorized interception 
and was counter to Congressional intent for the protections of the Act. See id. at 931 (citing In re 
Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18) (referencing the Act’s legislative intent). 
 78 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (providing three interrelated justifications for deter-
mining that the defendants were unauthorized third parties that accessed and duplicated the plaintiffs’ 
electronic communications, so the Party Exception did not apply). The court was concerned that a 
more expansive interpretation and application of the Party Exception would result in the exception 
overshadowing the rule. See id. (determining that a broad construction of the exception would run 
counter to the proper function and legislative intent of the Act). The court added that it was of no 
consequence that Facebook received a copy of the GET request simultaneous to the users’ intended 
transmission. See id. at 607 (detailing that Facebook only received a simultaneous GET request be-
cause it had placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ browsers, prompting such a transmission to 
occur). Although the timing of the acquisition is important, the key issue under the Party Exception is 
whether the plaintiffs had authorized Facebook to access this communication or whether their access 
constituted an interception. See id. (orienting the Act’s focus on determining who was a “party” to the 
communication and questioning whether a first party gave Facebook the requisite consent to gain 
entrance to the communication). 
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING PROMOTES THE LEGISLATIVE  
INTENT OF THE WIRETAP ACT AND DEMONSTRATES THE  
IMPORTANCE OF DATA PRIVACY 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2020 decision, Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Face-
book), sought to elucidate the meaning of the Party Exception within the con-
text of electronic communications.79 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling joined the ma-
jority approach by rejecting the notion that an entity may become party to a 
communication through deceptive measures.80 Section A of this Part details the 
manner in which the court’s interpretation of the Act aligns with legislative 
history and intent.81 Section B argues that applying the Party Exception to cir-
cumstances where a third party gains unauthorized access to a transmission 
would eviscerate the purpose of the Act.82 
A. The Ninth Circuit and Majority’s Interpretation  
Supports Legislative Purpose 
The legislature and courts have debated the meaning and application of 
the Act since its inception, paying particular concern to the protections afford-
ed to electronic communications.83 The Committee on the Judiciary acknowl-
edged that the Act has two key aims—to provide privacy protections for cov-
ered transmissions and to outline the conditions and situations under which 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020) (providing that, based on the legislative history and in-
tent and the precedent that other circuits established, a logical interpretation of the Act prohibits the 
unauthorized duplication of users’ data). 
 80 See id. (rejecting the Third Circuit’s position that treats entities that use deceitful means to 
acquire direct transmissions as intended parties to a communication, despite lacking a first party’s 
knowledge and consent). 
 81 See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Boyden, supra note 22, at 682–83, 699 (maintaining that the original definition of an inter-
ception under the Act in 1968 was fairly indistinct and that the ECPA’s enactment did not remedy the 
confusion as it simply adapted the original Act to encompass electronic communications). In its de-
scription of an interception, the Act does not mention the role of parties in a communication, thereby 
allowing the defendants to claim party consent. See id. at 688–89 (noting that the Act’s lack of men-
tion of a non-party intercepting the communication allowed the defendants to argue that they were 
authorized parties and thus incapable of intercepting the transmission). In effect, the legislature merely 
established that, based on the concern for privacy protections, unauthorized monitoring and acquisi-
tion of communications qualifies as an interception when it occurs without party consent. See S. REP. 
NO. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156 (explaining that, in addition 
to the unpermitted acquisition and surveillance of electronic communications, the Act forbids the 
subsequent use of that information for advertising, sales, or other uses). Notably, as technology and 
modes of communication have evolved, so too have discussions of the Act’s continued applicability. See 
Guffin, supra note 2, § 2.1 (detailing a significant number of cases under the Act, chronologizing the 
evolving history of courts’ interpretations of the Act as technology has evolved). But see Kerr, supra 
note 1, at 419 (concluding that the Act, and the ECPA generally, are no longer the best pieces of legis-
lation to address the modern technological landscape and privacy concerns given the increasing reli-
ance on computers and the Internet). 
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courts authorize interceptions.84 Central to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re 
Facebook was the legislative focus on privacy protections.85 The Act’s excep-
tions require narrow construction because the motivation for the Act was the 
need for comprehensive protection of Internet users’ privacy interests.86 An 
unknown third party’s interception of a communication, by its nature, is con-
trary to the Act’s desire to protect communications from unauthorized entities.87 
With this construction, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that, because the 
Act does not clearly define how an entity becomes a party to a communication, 
the court should rely on the ordinary meaning of the term “party.”88 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Protects Against Overly  
Expansive Constructions of the Party Exception 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling protects the integrity of the Act by conserving 
its intended breadth while maintaining a distinct carve-out for the Party Excep-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (stating that 
the Act only permits interceptions that fall into an exception or are done by authorized law enforcement 
personnel conducting investigatory surveillance). These two purposes ensure the preservation of privacy 
for oral and wire transmission. See id. (limiting the number of third parties accessing the communication 
allows the Act to safeguard constitutionally assured rights of privacy). The Committee posited that “vir-
tually all” agree that there is limited rationale for allowing an entity to intercept a communication 
absent party consent. See id. at 2156 (explaining its inhibition of unauthorized interception and use of 
communication contents). 
 85 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 598, 608 (citing Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th 
Cir. 2013)) (deducing that the Act’s legislative history demonstrates Congress’s desire to prevent 
authorized interceptions of communications). 
 86 See id. (outlining the chief objective of the Act as the preservation of privacy in (electronic) 
communications and describing legislative intent’s focus as preventing unconsented-to third parties 
from intercepting communications); Levinson, supra note 2, at 483 (highlighting that the Act’s legis-
lative focus and history support strong privacy protections). Levinson identified four pertinent canons 
of interpretation: that courts should interpret statutes according to their plain meaning, that courts 
should read statutes holistically, that differences in terms demonstrate differences in intent, and ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius. Id.; see also Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 35 (defining expressio unius as the canon that the expression of one notion 
implicates the exclusion of another, alternative notion). These canons allow courts to apply the Act in 
a manner that provides substantial privacy protections. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 483 (discussing 
the Act in relation to employee rights). 
 87 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (discussing the privacy concerns of the Act that mo-
tivated the court’s decision); Boyden, supra note 22, at 704 (adding that the privacy focus of the Act 
centers on whether third parties intercept communications without the consent of a first party). 
 88 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 607 (adopting the majority’s stance that unauthorized 
third parties are not “parties” to a communication within the meaning of the term); see also Brief for 
Plaintiff-Appellants [Redacted Version] at 45, Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet 
Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-17486), 2018 WL 3134964 at *45 (arguing that 
it is unreasonable to permit Facebook to access all the plaintiffs’ communications simply by virtue of 
having placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ computers). A ‘party’ to a communication is some 
entity that participates in the transaction. Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 35. 
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tion.89 The holding rejects the Third Circuit’s approach on the basis that the 
Act principally serves to bar unauthorized acquisitions of private communica-
tions and should not extend to permit party entrance by deceit.90 In joining the 
majority, the Ninth Circuit correctly demonstrated that courts should not apply 
the Party Exception to entities gaining party membership through deceptive 
means because it risks the scope of the exception outreaching the applicability 
of the Act, itself.91 To allow the Party Exception to encompass unknown third 
parties who gain access through fraudulent means would render the Act fu-
tile.92 It would be unable to sufficiently protect electronic communication and 
data privacy because this type of interception is a commonplace means of pri-
vacy intrusion.93 The In re Facebook ruling aligns with the central principles of 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (providing that, to preserve the integrity of the Act, 
the court cannot permit the application of the Party Exception in instances of unauthorized acquisition, 
duplication, and use of plaintiffs’ transmission). 
 90 See id. (citing In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 
(3d Cir. 2015)) (determining that an entity is not a party simply because it received a direct copy of a 
communication when it received the transmission by deceit). The Senate Report provided that, in 
application, courts should use the Act to prohibit interceptions from “unseen auditors”—these “un-
seen” entities are unconsented-to third parties, such as Facebook was in In re Facebook. See 956 F.3d 
at 908 (using the Act’s legislative intent to justify the rejection of the Party Exception where the de-
fendant was an unconsented-to third party and analogizing the defendant to “an unseen auditor”); S. 
REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67–68 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154, 2156 (discussing 
the need to establish the Act in a manner that inhibits the unauthorized acquisition of transmissions). 
 91 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (delineating the majority’s narrow construction of the 
Party Exception as it aligns with legislative intent to broadly protect privacy rights); Levinson, supra 
note 2, at 494 (maintaining that the Court should narrowly interpret the exceptions to the Act that may 
allow third parties to intercept transmissions in order to prevent over-expansive exceptions that no 
longer allow for the basic purpose of protecting the privacy of electronic communications). Compare 
In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 144 (finding that within the Seventh Circuit’s 1964 case, United 
States v. Pasha, there was support for the notion that an entity is a party to the communication so long 
as they actually participate in said communication, even if they gain access through deceit or fraud), 
with In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (determining that In re Google should not apply broadly to 
social networks because entities, such as Facebook, are not impersonating a party; rather, they are 
surreptitiously intercepting a communication through the installation of cookie software on the user’s 
computer), and S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66–69 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154–
56 (delineating an increasingly restrictive legislative history of the Act, culminating in the carving out 
of three exceptions that the legislature intended courts to narrowly construe). 
 92 See Levinson, supra note 2, at 482–83 (discussing the broad protections the Act affords, there-
by requiring narrow constructions of the exceptions). When enacting the ECPA, the intention was to 
devise an adaptable tool for privacy protection that would account for new mechanisms of communi-
cation and attempted intrusions. See id. at 483 (stating that the legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress intended the ECPA to provide broad privacy protections). 
 93 See In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d at 608 (noting the prevalence of using cookies to intercept 
GET requests and gain access to a user’s communications). Claimants have brought a wide range of 
cases under the Act concerning the invasion of privacy resulting from cookie placement on user hard 
drives. See generally Kletter, supra note 24 (providing an extensive discussion of the various treat-
ments of the Act as it relates to cookie placement to access transmissions). Central to these cases is the 
concern for the privacy interests of users when communicating electronically. See Blumofe v. Phar-
matrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Priv. Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing the 
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the Act of 1986, underscoring that technological evolution should not lead to 
forfeitures of personal privacy.94 In re Facebook opens the doors to a future of 
greater data privacy restrictions, a particularly striking prospect in the age of 
targeted advertisements, social media dominance, and internet supremacy.95 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 2020, in 
Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook), that unauthorized third parties do not 
fall within the scope of the Party Exception to the Wiretap Act. In In re Face-
book, Facebook acquired exact copies of the users’ browsing history when they 
visited websites with Facebook plug-ins, even though the users were not logged 
into Facebook. The court determined that, although the third party received exact 
copies, these users did not consent to the simultaneous duplication of their web 
searches. As such, Facebook unlawfully intercepted the users’ transmissions in 
violation of the Act. The court correctly employed a narrow construction of the 
Party Exception and protected the integrity of the Act by ensuring that the Party 
Exception does not become so inclusive as to overshadow the Act itself. It also 
aligned with legislative purpose and a history of providing broader privacy pro-
tections to modes of communication. This will become even more important as 
technology and modes of communication continue to evolve. 
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ECPA’s right of action against those who intentionally intercept communications without consent 
from a party to the communication). 
 94 See 956 F.3d at 608 (embracing, implicitly, that the legislative intent of the Act is to continual-
ly protect the privacy of communications as modes of communication evolve); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 
67 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 (concluding that legislation and Congress 
should continue to evolve as technology evolves). Some scholars have argued that courts should apply 
this evolving perspective of privacy across the various laws that the ECPA encompasses, such as the 
Stored Communications Act. See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third 
Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 71 (2013) (discussing the role of privacy laws in 
the modern context). 
 95 See Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, June 2020: Facebook, Cookies and Data Pri-
vacy: A Watershed Moment?, JDSUPRA (July 7, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/june-
2020-facebook-cookies-and-data-27641/ [https://perma.cc/H4AK-626E] (advising companies that use 
tracking cookies of their potential risk under the Act given the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the 
Party Exception); see also In re Facebook, Inc., 956 F.3d 589 (construing the Party Exception narrow-
ly to preserve privacy rights of parties in an electronic communication). 
